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New technology in the field of fertility has allowed for increased production of
human embryos.
Several conflicts occur given this increased number of
cryogenically frozen embryos. One such conflict is what to do with left over frozen
embryos when couples or individuals have decided that they have enough children or
no longer want children. Another issue is what to do with the embryos when a
couple disagrees as to whether they should be used. In trying to address these
concerns, one must decide whether an embryo should be treated as property. If so, to
whom does this property belong? If an embryo cannot be fit neatly into the domain
of property and be apportioned through such channels, can the realm of contract law
dictate the answer?
This Article addresses the conflicts that arise due to the increased number of
cryogenically frozen embryos produced during in vitro fertilization (IVF). Part I
discusses the IVF process, in general. While it recognizes the man’s role in the
process, it focuses primarily on the physical and emotional hardships that are placed
on the woman. Part I also gives the backdrop of the case law in the area of embryo
distribution. Part II introduces the idea that an embryo should be reduced to private
property, through utilization of the labor and economic theories of property law.
Additionally, an embryo’s use, rather than its waste, promotes a more efficient
society. The role that the legislature should play in the appropriation of embryonic
property is also addressed. The dominion of property law suggests that the
enforcement of contracts is eminent to communal survival. Part III discusses the
current regulations in place as well as the lack of direction given by these regulations
when a dispute arises as to the distribution of embryos. Part IV discusses how
contracts with IVF clinics meet the standard elements of enforceability in contract
law. This article also addresses the current criticisms and possible defenses against
such enforcement. Part V synthesizes the findings of the previous articles written on
this topic. The conclusion is that where a dispute arises concerning the use of
embryos, the party seeking to use or implant the embryos should prevail unless a
contract governing the dispute exists. Where an enforceable contract exists, that
contract should govern the distribution.
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I. BACKGROUND
IVF allows for couples or individuals, experiencing fertility problems, to increase
their chances of procreation. IVF is most often used when a pathologic fallopian
tube is unable to transport eggs to the uterus, where implantation into the uterine wall
and fertilization by the sperm must occur.1 Women undergoing IVF are exposed to
significant medical risks.2 To minimize the exposure to these risks, doctors can
retrieve and fertilize the eggs and then cryogenically freeze excess eggs for future
use should the initial attempt be unsuccessful.3 The freezing of fertilized eggs for
future implantation attempts reduces the physiological manipulation of the woman’s
reproductive system. That is, she will be forced to hormonally prepare for egg
retrieval to take place only once.4 If the eggs are fertilized and developed normally,
then the embryos are transferred to the woman’s uterus. Typically, multiple embryos
are transferred to increase the likelihood of pregnancy. If more than four eggs
develop into embryos, the donor may have the option of cryopreserving the
remaining embryos for thawing and replacement in a later IVF cycle.5
Three pivotal cases have marked the issues, progression, and struggling
ideologies associated with litigation over the excess frozen embryos. The first was
York v. Jones, heard in the Eastern District of Virginia in 1989.6 This case involved a
custody dispute between a couple participating in the IVF program, the Yorks, and
the IVF clinic, the Jones Institute.7 After four failed attempts at achieving pregnancy,
the Yorks subsequently moved to another state and sought to have the remaining
embryos transferred to an IVF clinic in that state.8 The Jones Institute refused to

1
Tanya Feliciano, Davis v. Davis: What About Future Disputes?, 26 CONN. L. REV. 305,
306-07 (1993).
2

Donna A. Katz, My Egg, Your Sperm, Whose Preembryo? A Proposal for Deciding
Which Party Receives Custody of Frozen Preembryos, 5 VA. J. SOC. POL’Y & L. 623, 629
(1998)(“including ovarian hyperstimulation syndrome, bleeding, infection, cysts, anesthesiarelated complications, and possibly an increased risk of thromboembolism, stroke myocardial
infarction and ovarian cancer, as well as difficult pregnancies and deliveries,” citing Peter J.
Neumann, Should Health Insurance Cover IVF? Issues and Options, 22 J. HEALTH POL.,
POL’Y & L. 1215, 1226 (1997)).
3
Id. (citing Monica Shah, Modern Reproductive Technologies: Legal Issues Concerning
Cryopreservation and Posthumous Conception, 17 J. LEGAL MED. 547, 550 (1996).
4
Id. at 629-30 (citing Monica Shah, Modern Reproductive Technologies: Legal Issues
Concerning Cryopreservation and Posthumous Conception, 17 J. LEGAL MED. 547, 550
(1996) and Jennifer Marigliano Dehmel, To Have or Not to Have: Whose Procreative Rights
Prevail in Disputes Over Disposition of Frozen Embryos? 27 CONN. L. REV. 1377, 1380
(1995).
5

In Vitro Fertilization (IVF), Microsoft Encarta Online Encyclopedia (2003), at
http://encarta.msn.com/encyclopedia_761577126/in_vitro_fertilization.html (last visited Nov.
21, 2003); Wash. State Dept of Health, Information Summary and Recommendations, at
http://www.doh.wa.gov/hsqa/sunrise/2000/infertility.doc (last visited Nov. 21, 2003).
6

York v. Jones, 717 F. Supp. 421 (E.D. Va. 1989).

7

Id. at 422.

8

Id. at 423-24.
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relinquish custody of the embryos.9 The court held that an agreement signed by the
Yorks created a bailor-bailee relationship with the Jones institute, stating that “all
that is needed is the element of lawful possession however created, and duty to
account for the thing as the property of another that creates the bailment[.]”10 The
holding reflects this court’s view that embryos are property, and when an IVF clinic
takes possession of the embryos, the clinic may refuse to allow the couple’s embryos
to be transferred elsewhere for implantation.11
The next piece of jurisprudence was set in place in 1992 by the Tennessee
Supreme Court in Davis v. Davis.12 This case involved a dispute between a divorced
couple over the disposition of seven frozen embryos in an IVF clinic.13 Mr. and Mrs.
Davis had experienced five ectopic pregnancies and seven failed IVF attempts
costing over $35,000.14 When adoption failed, the Davis’ had their seven excess
eggs frozen for future implantation attempts.15 Before implantation could be
performed, Mr. Davis filed for divorce. The only contested issue in the divorce was
the disposition of the frozen embryos.16 Mrs. Davis originally wished to have the
embryos implanted into her own body but subsequently decided that she wished to
have them donated to an infertile couple.17 Mr. Davis opposed the implantation of
the embryos into Mrs. Davis given that he did not wish to father any more children
and, especially any child that would not live with both biological parents.18
Additionally, Mr. Davis did not wish to donate the embryos to an infertile couple due
to his inability to control the psychological trauma that child may suffer with that
couple if they should, for example, divorce.19 The Tennessee Supreme Court
concluded that a more compelling interest lies in that of the party wishing to avoid
procreation, assuming that the party wishing to become a parent had other reasonable
means to do so (other than the embryos in question).20 Citing the American Fertility
Society guidelines, that the court stated, the embryos “are not, strictly speaking,
either ‘persons’ or ‘property,’ but occupy an interim category that entitles them to
special respect because of their potential for human life.”21 The absence of a
preliminary agreement, case or statutory law, and the fact that Mrs. Davis did not

9

Id.

10

Id. at 425 (internal citation omitted).

11

York, 717 F. Supp. at 425.

12

Davis v. Davis, 842 S.W.2d 588 (Tenn. 1992).

13

Id. at 589.

14

Id. at 591.

15

Id. at 592.

16

Id.

17

Davis, 842 S.W.2d at 589-90.

18

Id. at 604.

19

Id.

20

Id.

21

Id. at 597.
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want the embryos for implantation into her own body allowed for Mr. Davis’ privacy
interest to compel a verdict in his favor.
Six years later, the New York Court of Appeals ruled on a similar case. Unlike
the Davis case, in Kass v. Kass, at the time of the divorce proceedings the donor
mother, Mrs. Kass, sought to implant the embryos into her own body.22 This
presented what would seem to be a stronger case for implantation.23 After ten failed
attempts at IVF, costing more than $75,000, the Kass’ decided to have the five
excess eggs from their final attempt frozen.24 As in the Davis case, the donor father,
Mr. Kass, objected to the implantation, raising his privacy interest through arguing
the “burdens of unwanted fatherhood.”25 This case is distinguishable from the Davis
case, though, given that the Kass’ previously entered into a contract with the IVF
clinic allowing the IVF clinic to use the embryos for biological research or discard
them as the clinic sees fit, should the couple disagree as to the embryos disposition.26
After stating that the embryos were not “persons” within the meaning of the
constitution, the highest court in New York held that the intent of the parties was
expressed clearly and unambiguously in the contract with the IVF clinic and as such
should be presumed valid and binding.27 The court applied practical principles of
contract law to decide the case but added in a footnote that such a contract may be
precluded due to substantially changed circumstances or void as to public policy.28
In synthesizing these cases, it seems that where there is an absence of case law or
statutory guidance, courts will look to whether the embryo is property.29 If it is
determined that the embryo is property, then it will be disposed of as such.30 If it is
not property, instead something entitled to special respect, then the interest of the
parties are to be weighed when making the decision.31 Where there exists a contract
clearly stating the parties’ intent as to the disposition of the embryos should a dispute
arise, that contract seems to govern regardless of whether embryos are property.32
But can an entity, which may not be property, with the potential for human life fit
neatly into the confines of contract law or should such contracts be governed by a
special set of principles?

22

Kass v. Kass, 696 N.E.2d 174-75 (N.Y. 1998).

23
Luigi Brandimarte, Sperm Plus Egg Equals One “Boiled” Debate: Kass v. Kass and The
Fate of the Frozen Pre-Zygotes, 17 N.Y.L. Sch. J. Hum. Rts. 767 (2000).
24

Kass, 696 N.E.2d at 175-77.

25

Id. at 175.

26

Id. at 177.

27

Id. at 179.

28

Id. at 175, 179-82.

29

See York, 717 F. Supp. at 421.

30

Id.

31

See supra notes 12-21.

32

See Davis, 842 S.W.2d at 588.
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II. EMBRYONIC MATERIAL AS PROPERTY
What is property? Property rights evolved from a somewhat unitary
concept, of material objects controlled by individuals, to the concept of an
infinitely divisible bundle of rights — to minerals, air, light, access, water,
expected returns, occupancy, exclusive use, etc., rights which are subject
to multiple ownership and to numerous mixes of public…and individual
claims.33
Various theories govern allocation of property. To exemplify how embryos would
be viewed if they were merely property, one may examine embryos in light of both
the labor and economic theories of property. It was from these two theories that
much of today’s property rights were born.34
A. Labor/ Lockean Theory Of Property
The labor theory of property embodies the idea that everyone is entitled to the
fruits of his or her labor.35 This philosophy is coined the Lockean theory, after the
works of John Locke. Locke believed that one’s own person was their primary
possession and that the labor exerted
by an individual is an extension of the person and thus is the exclusive
right of that person. Thus, by mixing one’s ‘labor’ with a good … one
‘adds value’ to the good and one thus acquires ownership in that good. As
a result, an individual has a justified interest in a good when he has added
value to that good by exerting labor.36
In the process of IVF, a woman’s body labors through manipulation of her
reproductive system in the hormonal preparation for egg retrieval, consumes
prescription fertility medication, endures the process of egg retrieval, endures the
process of egg implantation, and deals with psychological stress.37
The
psychological stress may very well be brought about by aspirations of a successful
attempt as well as the knowledge of the risks to women associated with IVF.38
The risks associated with the medication the woman must consume prior to and
after egg retrieval include bruising and soreness with any injectable medications as
well as ovarian hyperstimulation syndrome which “can lead to dehydration, large
amounts of fluid accumulation in the abdominal and lung cavities, blood clotting

33

Donald A. Krueckeberg, The difficult character of property: to whom do things belong?,
J. AM. PLAN. ASS’N, June 22, 1995, at 61.
34
JESSIE DUKEMINIER & JAMES E. KRIER, PROPERTY 15-17, 136, 763-765, 774-775 (Aspen
Publishers 4th ed. 1998).
35

Id. at 15.

36

Joan E. Schaffner, Patent Preemption Unlocked, 1995 WIS. L. REV. 1081, 1087 (1995)
(citing JOHN LOCKE, TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT ¶ 27, and Justin Hughes, The
Philosophy of Intellectual Property, 77 GEO. L.J. 287, 289 (1993)).
37

Katz, supra note 2, at 629.

38

Id.
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disorders, and kidney damage.”39 Soft data also supports a possible link to ovarian
cancer.40
The transvaginal egg retrieval process is an ultrasound-guided procedure in
which “a long, thin needle is passed through the vagina into the ovary. Although
women are under sedation or local anesthesia, this procedure can cause mild to
moderate discomfort … Structures near the ovaries, such as the bladder, bowel, or
blood vessels, could possibly be injured and require further surgery.”41 Additionally,
bleeding from the ovary and infections are possible.42
Egg retrieval may also be accomplished through a laparoscopic procedure, where
a small incision in the abdomen is made.43 The risks, here, include “major injury to
the bladder, bowel, uterus, blood vessels, or other pelvic structures . . . If injury
occurs, further surgery may be required.”44 Infections and anesthesia complications
are also possible.45
Risks to the woman’s body are also present in the embryo transfer procedure.46
“The transfer of embryos may cause mild irritation to the cervix or uterus.”47 The
implantation of more than one embryo increases the chances of pregnancy but also
increases the likelihood that the risks associated with egg transfer will occur.48
While it cannot be argued that the male counterpart does not also experience the
psychological hardship and the “emotional rollercoaster” involved in failed IVF
attempts, a man does not face the same risks nor endure the bodily labor as that of
the woman.49 “Because the process of egg donation is much more physically
invasive than sperm donation, egg donation requires the assistance of a physician,
while sperm donation is easily accomplished without any physician assistance.”50
The fact that Locke placed such a high value on ownership of one’s body and one’s
bodily labor, suggests that application of a Lockean theory would dictate awarding
women with a property right in the remaining embryos.

39

AM. SOC’Y FOR REPROD. MED., FACT SHEET, RISKS OF IN VITRO FERTILIZATION (IVF)
(1996), at http://www.asrm.org/Patients/Factsheets/RisksIVF-Fact.pdf (last visited Nov. 21,
2003) [hereinafter FACT SHEET].
40

Id.

41

Id.

42

Id.

43

Id.

44

FACT SHEET, supra note 39.

45

Id.

46

Id.

47

Id.

48

http://www.sbivf.com/science/art_serv_embryo.htm

49

Michael L. Jackson, Fatherhood and the Law: Reproductive Rights and Responsibilities
of Men, 9 TEX. J. WOMEN & L. 53, 94 n.127 (1999).
50

Id.
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Locke also identifies two important conditions designed to protect the
“liberty” interest of the public which must be satisfied and which impose
limitations on what can justly be reduced to private property – the
“enough and as good condition” and the ‘non-waste’ condition. The
“enough and as good” condition protects against over-consumption .…
The “non-waste” condition requires that one [is] only appropriate that
which one can effectively use without any spoiling …. The result is that
an individual who has exerted labor and added value to a good still may
not be justified in claiming a property interest if it will result in waste or
violate the enough and as good condition.51
Therefore, the primary principle in Locke’s theory is that one who has added the
most value to a good or property through bodily labor lay the best claim to that
property, but only to the extent that that person’s appropriation of the property does
not result in waste.52
Locke’s principle theory that adding one’s labor to property is what gives that
person the right to possession. The rationale is that the person who adds value to
property should be so rewarded with ownership. Therefore, an argument could be
made that the party who exerts the most bodily labor should not be the determining
factor, but instead, award ownership to the party that adds the most value. The male
IVF participant may then argue that his sperm donation is just as crucial to bringing
the embryo to life as the bodily labor the woman endures, and thus, it adds the same
amount of value. The IVF clinic may also argue that without its labor, the embryo
could not exist. The answer lies in the conditions set forth in Locke’s theory. The
underlying maxims in the “enough and as good” and “non-waste” conditions place a
limitation on the party asserting a property right that will allow for the property to
“spoil” or go unused.53
Two possible scenarios highlight Locke’s view. Where the donating woman, the
donating man, and the IVF clinic are competing for the embryos, all with the
intention of putting them to use, Locke would award the embryos to the woman.
Locke’s primary principle is that property should be awarded first and foremost to
the party that expends the most bodily labor. Between the woman, the man, and the
IVF clinic, the woman expends more of her person, through mixing more of her
labor, to produce the embryo.
An exception lies in Locke’s primary principle where the person exerting the
most labor does not choose to utilize the resource, allowing it to “spoil.”54 Thus,
where the woman does not wish to attempt to give life to the embryo but the man
does, the woman’s labor will be preempted and the embryo will be awarded to the
party seeking the embryo’s use and has added the most value. The argument that the
man has added equal value will be used to preempt the woman’s argument of
supreme bodily labor, where the woman does not seek the use of the embryo.
51
Schaffner, supra note 36, at 1088 (citing Wendy J. Gordon, A Property Right in SelfExpression: Equality and Individualism in the Natural Law of Intellectual Property, 102 YALE
L.J. 1533, 1547 (1993), Locke, supra note 36, ¶¶ 27, 31, and Hughes, supra note 36, 296-98).
52

See supra note 35, at 15 and note 36, at 1087-88.

53

See supra note 51.

54

Schaffner, supra note 36, at 1088.
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Therefore, according to Lockean theory, the primary concern in awarding property
rights, is who exerted the most labor.55 Then one will look to who will allow for
utilization of the embryo.56 Where the person mixing his/her own labor will allow
for the embryo to spoil, property rights will be awarded to another individual who
added value to the embryo and will allow for the embryo to be used.57 In the Davis
case, a woman wanted to use the embryos and the man did not. Under the Lockean
theory, the woman would be said to have a stronger property interest in the embryos
because she exerted the most bodily labor, and she wanted to implant the embryos.
Donors seeking to avoid the implantation of the embryos argue that another
exception should exist to Locke’s theory of supreme bodily labor.58 This exception
lies in the donor privacy interest in the avoidance of unwanted parenthood.59 In the
Davis case, such an argument was made by Mr. Davis and accepted by the court.60
The attractiveness of a Lockean moral philosophy approach is that it
provides the Court with a principled basis for deciding privacy cases, a
basis which would temper the Court’s past desire to recognize individual
rights to the exclusion of other societal concerns … Under the Lockean
liberal tradition, an individual’s natural law duty to preserve both the life
of, and capacity for rational liberty in, his fellow man limit that
individual’s natural rights.61
Therefore, it has been determined that where one mixes his/her own labor with a
resource, adds value to it, and intends to utilize the resource without allowing for it
to spoil, he/she should be awarded ownership.62 The next question is whether a
competing interest, like privacy, would preempt such ownership. When analyzing
the nature of a privacy interest asserted, one must look to whether the act from which
the individual seeks defense is one that “truly affects the individual’s capacity for
rational deliberation and self-direction. [In the instant situation, if the use of the
embryos would truly affect the donor seeking to avoid parenthood’s individual
capacity for rational deliberation and self-direction.] If the asserted privacy interest
does directly involve the individual’s rational liberty it should be classified as
‘fundamental.’”63
Where the privacy interest sought to be protected is
“fundamental,” any claim seeking to override that privacy interest must overcome a
test of “strict scrutiny.”64 It “must [be] show[n] that the capacity for rational
55

See supra notes 35-36.

56

See supra note 51.

57

See supra notes 35-36, 51.

58

See supra notes 19-20, 25.

59

Id.

60

See supra note 18.

61

Jeffrey S. Koehlinger, Substantive Due Process Analysis and the Lockean Liberal
Tradition: Rethinking the Modern Privacy Cases, 65 IND. L.J. 723, 742 (1990).
62

See supra notes 35-36, 51.

63

Koehlinger, supra note 61, at 742-43.

64

Id. at 743.
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deliberation and self-direction in others is significantly restricted or inhibited by the
unregulated exercise of the asserted privacy interest.”65 Where a privacy interest did
not involve an individual’s capacity for rational liberty, it would not be fundamental
and would only be subject to a test of “rational basis.”66 In a “rational basis” review,
“any rational purpose for the regulation would usually be sufficient.”67
Unquestionably, becoming a parent, especially when parenthood is unwanted,
interferes with one’s rational liberty. In some states, a sperm donor can avoid
parental responsibility by following certain statutory procedures.68 However, the
vast majority of states fail to shield a sperm donor from the responsibilities
associated with full parenthood, where the woman seeking implantation is unmarried
and the sperm donor is identifiable.69 As one judge put it, “[W]oe be it to the bio-dad
who presumes to avoid his responsibility to support his child when no other
presumed father asserts paternity.”70 Additionally, the psychological ramifications of
knowing that you have a biological child out in the world may also be quite
burdensome on some men. Given this interference with one’s rational liberty,
granting a woman the right to implant an embryo in her body where the man no
longer wishes to complete IVF questions a “fundamental” privacy interest of the
man. Therefore, one must decide whether a woman’s desire to implant the embryo
survives a “strict scrutiny” test.71
There are times where factors, such as the likelihood of the party asserting use of
the embryos being able to achieve parenthood through other reasonable means, come
into play. According to the Lockean theory, a party seeking to use the embryos must
show that rational deliberation and self-direction in others is significantly restricted
or inhibited by the non-implantation of the embryos.72 It is obvious that the failure to
implant the embryos will inhibit the deliberation and ability to self-direct for the
potential life that may result from each embryo. The problem is that if the embryo is
property and not a human life, the effects to that potential life cannot be accounted
for in Locke’s quantitative method of balancing privacy versus the overall good.
What can be accounted for are the effects that discarding the embryo will have on
those who are living. Just as parenthood affects the party who does not wish for it,
parenthood even more so affects the party who plans to be in the child’s life. The
ability to force parenthood on someone is juxtaposed with the ability to deny
someone the ability to become a parent. Thus, in situations where a party has no
other reasonable means to become a parent, the privacy interest of the party arguing
non-use of the embryos is outweighed by the party seeking use of the embryos,
65

Id.

66

Id.

67

Id.

68

Judge Robert D. Monarch, In re Marriage of Buzzanca: Trial Court Analysis, 26 W. ST.
U. L. REV. 1 (1999) (citing Cal. Fam. Code § 7613 (West 1994)).
69

MAUREEN H. MONKS, ET AL., CH. 1 REPRESENTING NONTRADITIONAL FAMILIES
(Massachusetts Continuing Legal Education, Inc. 2001).
70

Monarch, supra note 68, at 7.

71

See supra note 63-64.

72

See supra notes 64-65.
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especially in the case of multiple embryos being implanted into different women. In
this case, capacity for rational deliberation and self-direction is significantly
restricted.
However, where the women have other reasonable means of achieving
parenthood, a different outcome may be warranted. Although the tribulations
endured by Mrs. Davis and Mrs. Kass prior to the freezing of the embryos seem to
dictate another line of reasoning,73 courts may decide that it is not unreasonable to
have the party go through these procedures again.74 Little to no significance is given
to monetary or psychological costs.75 Although treating the embryo as property may
forbid the analysis of how the choices will affect the potential life of an embryo, one
can look to the effects on those already living. In this examination, one may look as
to how the community at large would suffer from the lack of that life coming to be.
The problem revolves around how one would measure the benefits that potential life
could bring to society. Just as easily as one could argue the possibility of that
embryo resulting in a future president, medical researcher, or any other productive
citizen, the same could be argued that the embryo may result in a serial killer,
deviant, or other non-productive member of society. The tie-breaker to this struggle
lies in how Locke reveres morality. In the current application of Locke’s theory of
persons, “[t]hese are the feelings we call on when arguing for housing for the
homeless, health care for the poor, and inoculations and education for poor children.
Such arguments are at bottom about the distribution of property, and are decided to a
significant extent by how you define property.”76 To Locke, a property interest will
only be recognized where, with a person’s own bodily labor, one adds value to that
property.77 “Value is measured by the usefulness of the product to society.”78 Labor
“which produces something useful—adds value to society—deserves to be
rewarded.”79 Therefore, what Locke values is that which is useful where a discarded
embryo cannot be. The public goal is to encourage productivity, to promote work.80
The ideology of a community working to form its members into productive citizens
fits much more easily into that framework, than to discard potential members and
hypothesizing that they may not have been productive members anyhow.
Additionally, a court following a Lockean moral philosophy reasoned that
“right[s] … might in some instances be limited … in order to preserve the ‘safety,
health, morals and general welfare of the public.’”81 Creation of life would seem to
be a public moral.

73

See supra notes 14-15, 24.

74

See supra note 12.

75

Id.

76

Krueckeberg, supra note 33.

77

See supra notes 35-36.

78

Schaffner, supra note 36, at 1087.

79

Id. at 1088.

80

DUKEMINIER & KRIER, supra note 34.

81

Koehlinger, supra note 61, at 737 (citing Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 53 (1905)).
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Under this … approach, society’s compelling interest in promoting the
rational liberty of all will ensure that minority interests that do not unduly
burden the capacities for rational deliberation and self-direction in others
will be given at least as much, if not more, protection …. Thus, by
rethinking the modern privacy cases under this Lockean moral philosophy
approach, courts can achieve results that are more consistent, analytically
sound and well-supported by a coherent moral philosophy.82
Upon determination of how property rights should be allocated and which
exceptions should be accounted for, one must determine how the government should
inform the public and enforce these rights. Locke’s view on legislation is that it
must be with limitation.83 That is, “because the proper end of civil society is the
common good and the common good entails ‘the mutual Preservation of their Lives,
Liberties, and Estates,’ there naturally emerge several important limits to the power
of the legislature.”84 Locke contended that the legislature must not arbitrarily
regulate the means by which an individual can achieve rational liberty and
determined that the best approach to resolving the constitutionality of state regulation
is to ensure that it does not interfere with an individual’s “asserted right to
contract.”85
Thus, Locke has laid down a hierarchy of property principles and those principles
should be embodied in the laws set forth by the legislature.86 The legislature should
not enact regulations in regard to property that are not harmonious with that
hierarchy of principles.87 All of which may be preempted by an individual’s right to
contract.88 While Locke seems weary of state or federal regulation of an individual’s
means, he does seem adamant in his belief in the right to contract. In Lochner v.
New York, the United States Supreme Court found that:
The individual’s ‘personal liberty’ is equivalent to his ability to “enter into
those contracts in relation to labor which may seem to him appropriate or
necessary for the support of himself and his family.” … [T]he [c]ourt
recognized as fundamental “the rights of individuals … to make contracts
regarding labor upon such terms as they may think best, or which they
may agree upon with the other parties to such contracts.”89
Allocation of a property interest to an individual who mixes his labor and adds value
to a resource, and the limitation of that individual’s ability to exert control over that
resource by disallowing the right to contract, undermines the entire ideology of the
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labor theory.90 Such a practice would discourage labor and, thus, diverge from every
principle taught by Locke and embodied in property laws of today.91
B. Economic Theory Of Property
Opponents to Locke’s labor theory believe that in some facets, the ideology is
limited.92 The limitation is demonstrated through the progression of property
theorists. Beginning with Locke, property rights theorists assumed that property law
began in a state of nature in which all goods were dedicated to the commons or
belonged equally to everyone. 93 However, at some point, parts of the commons
became sufficiently scarce and it became economically beneficial to reduce portions
of the commons to private property.94 The incentive of private ownership maximizes
productivity because not only will people take better care of property that they own
compared with property shared with the community, but it prevents overconsumption
of communal property.95 Thus, property rights evolve “in response to changing
economic conditions. When a resource becomes more valuable due to changing
technology or some other ‘exogenous’ shock, property rights over it are specified
with greater precision. When the gains from granting and administering rights come
to exceed the costs, the rights will be granted.”96 Therefore, opponents to Locke’s
views are of the opinion that property should not be apportioned to those who mix
their labor with the resource. Rather, property should be apportioned in accordance
with economic efficiency and, the theory of law and economics.97
Judge Richard A. Posner, a proponent of theories of law and economics, warns
that efficient distribution of property rights requires universality, exclusivity, and
transferability.98 Universality requires that all property be privately owned and
valued, allowing an exception for property considered to be an unlimited resource
that is not devalued by the use of others.99 Whether an embryo is an unlimited
resource is debatable. There is an unlimited supply of eggs and an unlimited supply
90
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of sperm but a limited resource of money. Additional factors go into the creation of
an embryo. First, there is the willingness of women to donate eggs and men to
donate sperm. Next, there is the fact that each embryo is unique, having its own
separate DNA. The same is said about snowflakes, but one would hardly argue that
they are a limited resource.
In the case of an embryo when that embryo is used by someone else or discarded,
it diminishes another’s capacity for use. When looked at in the situations presented
in the York, Kass, and Davis cases, one can see that an embryo is a limited
resource.100 For example, Mr. and Mrs. Davis were only able to create seven
embryos.101 Mrs. Davis sought the right to only seven embryos, and there was no
immediate prospect that any more embryos from Mrs. Davis’ egg and Mr. Davis’
sperm would be forthcoming.102 Therefore, if embryos are limited in supply, an
efficient property system would require that they be subject to private ownership.103
To meet the requirement of exclusivity, one must have the ability to prevent
others from using one’s property.104 Therefore, if an embryo is property, the next
important element is whose property is it. If it is determined that the embryo is the
property of the party seeking to discard it, then that party would be entitled to
prevent its use. In contrast, if the party seeking to use the embryo is deemed to have
the superior property interest, that party may exclude the other party from having any
authority over the embryo. Further inquiry into economic efficiency will determine
who would acquire ownership of the embryo, if that embryo is considered property.
Transferability is the idea that the value of property is maximized through a
capitalist market of free exchange.105 Whether such a notion is applicable to an
embryo must be considered in relation to whether an embryo is property and,
evaluated along the guidelines of other pieces of property. Free exchange not only
implies allowing the market to determine the worth of a resource but also allowing
that resource to be free from legislative and judicial interference.106
In the realm of economic theory, property rights should be allocated to shape
behavior in a manner that maximizes productivity.107
Proceeding on the basic assumption that man is a rational maximizer of
his own self-interest, Posner derives certain fundamental concepts: (1) that
there is an inverse relation between the price charged and the quantity
demanded of a good; (2) that the cost of a good is the price that the
resources consumed in making and selling it would command in their
next-best use; and (3) that resources will gravitate toward their most
valuable uses if voluntary exchange is permitted. These basic economic
100
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principles lead to the conclusion that the value of a thing is determined by
the exchanges people will engage in to buy or sell it. Essentially, what
this means is that in a free-market system, all goods will be put to their
best uses because those people who derive the most value from them will
give the most to obtain them.108
Posner is known for applying economic theory outside of its traditional domain.
Posner employed his first fundamental concept, more commonly referred to as the
law of supply and demand, in the arena of the adoption market.109 He argues that
regulatory interference in the adoption market has created a shortage of babies and
allowed for the existence of a black market for babies.110 Such regulation has
additionally allowed for a surplus of unadopted children remaining in foster homes at
the public’s expense.111 Posner argues that the most prohibitive regulation is the
price at which adoption agencies may contract with the birth parents, which prevents
the adoption market from functioning at equilibrium.112 As such, birth parents who
place less value in their offspring would be more inclined to place their child up for
adoption while adoptive parents, who would arguably place a higher value on a
child’s life, would have the opportunity to adopt.113 Such an argument not only
illustrates the law of supply and demand but also takes into account the child’s
welfare.
It may be inferred that a significant number of couples seeking to adopt children
are infertile, as exemplified by the tribulations of Mrs. Davis.114 It also may be
asserted that parties prohibited by courts to use the frozen embryos may consider the
adoption market, or even the black market for adoption, as the next reasonable
alternative. Such an occurrence would add to the demand for babies while
increasing the shortage, which pulls the adoption market further away from
equilibrium. Due to the expense of the IVF process, it is also a logical assumption
that the majority of couples utilizing IVF procedures are white couples.115 Allowing
these embryos to become white babies would decrease the shortage of white babies
and allow for the price of adoption to more closely resemble equilibrium. Therefore,
it would seem that, because an embryo has the value of potential life, application of
Posner’s first fundamental concept would weigh in favor of the party seeking to use
the embryo.
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Embodied in Posner’s second fundamental concept dealing with a property’s
“next-best use” is the idea of “opportunity cost.”116 That is, by utilizing an element
of property in one way, other uses of the property must be forgone.117 A cost that is
born by those other than the actors, such as opportunity cost, is an externality.118
Optimal use of property requires minimization of costs;119 thus, utilization of
property can only be economically efficient where the costs are outweighed by the
benefits.
The opportunity cost in utilizing the embryo in the manner proposed by the party
seeking non-use is extremely high. First, it could possibly deny the party seeking to
use the embryo parenthood. This is where the “other reasonable means” of
achieving parenthood rationale may find root in economic theory. Second, the
opportunity forgone is that of potential life, which includes all the accomplishments
of life and how that life may have affected many other lives. It is this second
argument that would be most persuasive to Posner.120
Economic theory warns that, whenever the effects generated by private
agreements fall on third parties who have not participated in the [decision
of how the property is utilized] the allocation of resources may diverge
from the ideal equilibrium … [and economic efficiency] will not be met if
an exchange has made someone better off while making others worse
off.121
Additionally, Posner believes that “[i]n a world of scarce resources, waste should be
regarded as immoral.”122
One may question how Posner, being a strong advocate of personal autonomy,
would evaluate the opportunity cost of the party seeking nonuse of the embryos.123
Use of the embryos would cause this person a failure to exercise their right to
privacy and may force him to bear the burden of unwanted parenthood. Posner
believes that, “[i]f the cost of vindicating or exercising rights exceeds their marginal
returns, the claim will not be exercised.”124 That is, if the cost of preventing life of
the embryo outweighs the benefit the donor would receive by avoiding parenthood,
the privacy interest is preempted. Even though Posner is an advocate of personal
autonomy, he recognizes the need for its sacrifice where exercising such autonomy
poses too great a cost.
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Posner’s third fundamental concept of economic theory is that in the ideal market
place, resources or property will gravitate toward their most valuable use.125 In a
situation where one party seeks the embryo for implantation and the other party
wishes for the embryo to be discarded, the embryo’s most valuable use is
implantation. A discarded embryo can serve no purpose and therefore has no use.
However, in the situation where one party seeks to use the embryo for implantation
and the other wishes to allow the IVF clinic to appropriate the embryo for biological
research, the answer is not as clear. One could argue that an embryo’s most valuable
use is its potential for life. Yet, another may argue that the maximum use of an
embryo is met through its sacrifice for research, which results in a larger abundance
of potential life for others.
According to Posner, the value of a resource or element of property is measured
by “the exchanges people will engage in to buy or sell it.”126 The question, then, is
whether an IVF clinic would pay more to obtain the embryo for research or whether
a party seeking its use would pay more to have the embryo implanted. Could one
assume that Posner would advocate that the embryo goes to the highest bidder?
To answer that question one must look back to the root of economic theory. The
basis for economic theory derived from the utilitarian approach to property.127 While
utilitarianism still favors maximum productivity, it views property as a means to an
end, and its purpose is to maximize the happiness of all citizens by allocating and
promoting the general welfare of society.128 Therefore, the issue is whether it is in
the best interest of society to allow that embryo life or use it for research in the hopes
that it will allow for others to live. A utilitarian would choose the means that brings
about the greatest benefit to society as a whole.129 The
dichotomy within the self is one that needs to [be] decided between
choices of ‘consequential’ or ‘deontologic nature’… [For example
imagine] being faced with the option of torturing a child in order to save
the rest of the world of all harm. The consequential component of our
moral thinking cares about the number of people that will be injured under
each decision. By contrast, the ‘deontologic’ component refers to the
component that will have nothing to do with hurting the child.130
The economic approach to property law grew out of dissatisfaction with the
ephemeral concept of human happiness and the difficulty of how it could be
measured.131
Given that Posner is a true economist, unhappy with impractical measure of
human happiness or society welfare, it is likely that Posner would award the embryo
to the party who would pay more for it. As noted previously, Posner believes that
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the person who would value a resource more is the person willing to pay more for
it.132 Therefore, if an embryo is property, the wealth maximization principle should
apply. Whether Posner believes that an embryo is property plays an important role,
which is illuminated by his views on abortion.133 Further investigation into Posner’s
approach to abortion shows that while economics may pinpoint
family and gender legal issues and provide some answers, abortion is one
of those social dilemmas that cannot be solved through economic analysis.
There is a simple libertarian solution to abortion only if one does not
consider the fetus’s utility. Without considering the interest of the fetus,
the mother should be entitled to abort, subject to the father’s permission if
an implicit or explicit contract makes the fetus a joint asset. However, if
the fetus is a member of society whose welfare counts, such a contact has
third party effects and may not be presumed to be wealth maximizing.
Likewise, if one recognizes the sanctity of life and the limits of any social
policy in the face of such supreme value, no insight can be derived from
economic analysis or libertarian ideologies. Since the decision to believe
in the supreme value of life from the time of conception and the decision
to include the utility of the fetus in the social welfare calculation is a
moral one, libertarians and economists have nothing to say on the matter
of abortion.134
Therefore, only then, if an embryo is property can economic theory be applied.
According to Posner, economic theory dictates that if an embryo is property, then
it should not be discarded.135 In application of all three of his fundamental principles
the party seeking to use the embryo should prevail.136 The only question arises when
the dispute ensues between the parties and a contract exists dictating that in such a
dispute, the embryos should be used by the fertility clinics for biological research.
To determine the proper outcome one must look to Posner’s disposition on contract
law.
Just as adoption principles were used to clarify the fundamental concepts of the
economic theory, so can Posner’s position on enforceability of surrogacy contracts
be used to evaluate enforcement of contracts concerning frozen embryos.137
According to Posner, parties will not enter into a contract unless they believe that it
will be mutually beneficial.138 Efficiency is the core principle in the economic
approach to contracts because efficiency maximizes wealth, and in the economic
world, wealth is how one measures happiness.139 Posner believes that freedom of
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contract must be held above all else, even in cases where “ex post facto screening of
fairness and social desirability becomes necessary for the protection of the
contracting parties and society at large,”140 such as is argued in the case of surrogacy
contracts. When contracts are subject to legislative or judicial interference an added
element of uncertainty exists.141 Uncertainty is contrary to the wealth maximizing
principle because it lowers the value of a resource due to the fact that the purchasing
party would have to be compensated for such uncertainty.142 Therefore, enforce
those contracts that offend social desirability because, just as in the case of any other
contract, it is in the best interest of the parties to make contracts enforceable.143
Opponents to enforceability of surrogate contracts argue that Posner’s theory is
flawed in three areas.144 First, where Posner states that parties enter contracts for a
mutual benefit because people are “rational maximizers” of their own wealth,
opponents argue that surrogate mothers cannot fully appreciate how it will feel to
give up their child before that situation actually occurs.145 Therefore, surrogate
mothers are not in a position to make an informed decision that maximizes their
wealth because they underestimate the negative effect that giving up their child will
have on them.146 This argument may be likened to infertile couples who contract
away their rights to the embryos before a dispute arises as to their use.147 Parties
realize that multiple eggs will be harvested, but they may underestimate the amount
of attempts it will take for a successful IVF procedure.148 Besides underestimating
the probability that they may actually need every embryo created and given that the
contract is signed prior to the procedure, they may also underestimate the despair
they would feel in undergoing the procedure again with another sperm donor.149 One
especially may underestimate the possibility of a dispute even arising.150
The second flaw, opponents argue, of Posner’s theory is that he believes that the
majority of surrogate mothers are women who have already had children and have a
level of maturity that allows for an informed decision.151 Posner cites empirical data
that seems to show that it is doubtful that surrogate mothers are poor and desperate
women driven to rent their bodies as a last option at survival.152 Instead, their
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motivation is empathy for the father’s infertile wife.153 Opponents argue that the
level of a woman’s maturity and the fact that she has children is comparable to that
of an individual blind at birth who cannot truly appreciate what it is to see.154
Nothing can prepare a woman for giving up a child except actually doing it,
therefore, neither maturity, having other children, nor publicity of surrogacy cases
gone sour can truly make surrogate mothers fully informed.155 Again, in comparing
this situation to that of embryos, the parties cannot truly appreciate the desperation
they will feel in the need to use those embryos until the time comes when the
embryos are needed.156
Third, opponents believe that Posner’s prediction that non-enforcement of
surrogacy contracts will vastly disadvantage contract law in general is overstated.157
Instead, adversaries say, surrogates are a unique class of people entitled to special
protection given the fact that they are not in a position to make a fully informed
decision when entering into the contract.158 Surely then, infertile couples can be seen
as a unique class in need of that same protection. Infertile couples are uninformed as
to the desperation one party may feel in the inability to use the frozen embryos.
Although such criticisms exist, Posner, like Locke, holds above all else the right
to contract.159 Posner, like Locke although for different reasons, advocates the use of
the embryo.160 Both theorists also recognize that an exception should be recognized
where the parties have previously contracted upon the matter in dispute.161 Both
Posner and Locke hold one’s fundamental right to contract so high they advocate that
such a contract should preempt the fundamental tenants of their respective school of
thought.162 Additionally, Posner would advocate the use of contracts to avoid
litigation.163 The cost of litigation is an external cost and as such economists seek to
elude litigation whenever possible.164
Another aspect upon which Posner and Locke agree is that of governmental
interference in the form of promulgating regulation.165 While Posner does not look
favorably on judicial and legislative intervention, he believes that the regulations that
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exist should be defined in a clear manner.166 A clear indication of what is expected of
people will decrease information cost and external costs of litigation.167 For those
same reasons, rights and regulations should be public, predictable, easily
discoverable, and more stable than less.168 Posner suggests “generally applicable
laws, regulations and regulatory procedures, which aid in the discovery of rights
boundaries and the equitable enforcement of rights and duties as defined.”169
Institutions of the state should be held responsible and “should have [the] sufficient
powers, duties, liabilities, and resources … necessary to facilitate the neutral
validation and enforcement of property rights and duties at the least possible cost.”170
Public actors should also be held responsible for enforcing these generally applicable
laws in a faithful manner.171
III. CURRENT REGULATION OF EMBRYONIC MATERIALS
A. Statements By Expert Agencies
IVF, in general, is minimally regulated at the federal level.172 In fact, the IVF
industry operated without any federal regulation for many years.173 However, in
1992, Congress enacted the Fertility Clinic Success Rate and Certification Act.174
This act called for the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention to develop a
model certification procedure for IVF clinics and laboratories that could be adopted
by each state, as well as compile IVF pregnancy success statistics to be annually
reported.175 The purpose for such enactment, besides reporting pregnancy success
rates, was to universalize consistent IVF procedures in hopes of assuring quality and
adequate recordkeeping at each certified IVF clinic and laboratory.176 This
legislation may fail to fulfill its objectives because “clinic certification and reporting
are voluntary under the Act, with the only penalty for noncompliance being public
identification as a program that has failed to do so.”177
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After deeming the IVF procedure ethically acceptable in 1986, the Ethics
Committee of the American Fertility Society distributed ethical guidelines for IVF.178
While these guidelines did not formally comment on the moral classifications of
embryos, the Committee stated that an embryo “deserves greater respect than
accorded other human tissue, since it has the potential to become a human person, it
is not accorded the respect of an actual human being.”179 This was the notion
followed by the Davis court.180 Even though the embryos were equated greater
deference than mere property, Mr. Davis’ privacy interest coupled with Mrs. Davis’
ability to achieve motherhood by other reasonable means allowed for a ruling in
favor of Mr. Davis.181
[T]his human potential limits ‘the circumstances in which a[n] … embryo
may be discarded or used in research and the statute makes clear that
embryos should not be treated as a person because of a lack of features of
personhood, individual development, and the possibility of never reaching
the full biological potential. Therefore, while … embryos are entitled to
‘profound respect,’ such respect does not entitle the embryo to full moral
and legal rights accorded to full persons.182
Additionally, these guidelines call for the commissioning couple to sign a blanket
consent form that covers the various steps involved in IVF. The commissioning
couple also has sole discretion in deciding the disposition of the embryos as long as
such disposition is within the medical and ethical standards set forth in the guidelines
themselves.183 “Similar to the [Fertility Clinic Success Rate and Certification] Act,
compliance with the American Fertility Society’s guidelines is purely voluntary.”184
The Committee on Medicolegal Problems and the Council on Ethical and Judicial
Affairs of the American Medical Association addressed the ethical and legal issues
involved in the freezing of excess embryos in the IVF process. This report made
three recommendations:
(1) Primary authority for frozen … embryos rests with the two gamete
providers, and they must agree to any disposition of the … embryos;
(2) Agreements by the gamete providers for the future disposition of
their…embryos should generally be enforceable. However, either gamete
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provider should be able to show that changed circumstances make
enforcement of the agreement unreasonable. The gamete providers should
not be required to enter into an agreement that will govern the future
disposition of their … embryos; (3) Frozen … embryos may be used by
the gamete providers, donated for use by other parties, or donated for
research. The frozen … embryo may also be allowed to thaw and
deteriorate.185
In a letter to the editor of the Journal of the American Medical Association, an
individual voiced the concerns of the medical community.186 The letter predicted
that allowing the donation of embryos to other parties would result in the
commodification of children.187 The author argued that the donation of embryos
would cause the resulting child emotional harm due to the inability to identify with
the non-biological parents and the lack of information concerning family
background, inherited diseases, and overall knowledge of medical and genetic
heritage.188 Additionally, the recommendations given by the Journal “were criticized
for failing to ‘offer a convincing moral and legal rationale for giving gamete
providers absolute discretion over the fate of frozen embryos’ and suggested that
such a rationale be developed.”189
The Board of Trustees replied to these criticisms by standing its ground on its
recommendation to donate embryos, stating that such donation is not commercially
motivated but motivated by altruistic sentiments.190 Additionally, the Board stated
that the emotional development of a resulting child is at best speculative and that “it
is difficult to conclude that [he/she] would have been better off not being born.”191
The Board did concede that embryos should under no circumstances be sold.192
Posner argues that economic efficiency calls for rules to be easily discoverable
and adequately and informatively defined.193 Additionally, Posner pronounces that
institutions of the state be vested with the power to sufficiently enforce the
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distribution of rights.194 Locke and Posner further contend that if regulation is
needed, it must not be arbitrary.195 The regulations set forth by these administrative
agencies do not meet the requirements set forth by Locke and Posner. The first
criticism is that they are voluntary, which cannot only be considered arbitrary, but
does very little to guide state legislators or the courts, increasing external information
and judicial costs.196 These regulations anticipate arguments of a lack of informed
consent by requiring the reporting of results and statistics as well as having the
commissioning couple sign consent forms, but do not rise to the extent of quashing
the argument.197 Additionally, the Ethics Committee of the American Fertility
Society blurs the line between property and non-property by creating a separate
quasi-property category for the embryo.198 However, the regulation fails to dictate to
the state legislatures or the courts what guidelines should be applied to this new class
of property. Finally, while it seems that the institution of contract law would supply
the only means for universality in the treatment of embryos, the Committee on
Medicolegal Problems and the Council on Ethical and Judicial Affairs of the
American Medical Association states that couples do not have to contract as to the
disposition of the embryos in the case of a dispute.199
Current state statutes reflect some of the ideologies set forth by the foregoing
expert agencies.200 Some states choose to categorize an embryo as a person and
therefore apply moral guidelines to its treatment.201 These statutes address the
physical and psychological welfare of the resulting child, while at times ignoring
regulation of the IVF procedure itself. Other states dictate that an embryo is
property, yet in some instances fail to apply property rationales to its treatment.202
Still, other states refuse to label the embryo as either property or non-property,
leaving that burden on the court.203 The classification as to property or non property
is further skirted through reverence to contract law.
B. Current State Statutes
Due to the lack of federal regulation, states retain the power to enact and adopt
their own legislation concerning IVF procedures. These statutes vary vastly from one
another and act to prohibit universal and consecutive outcomes between states.204
Given that many of the states do not give proper direction to the court, they do little
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to reduce information and judicial costs as well as prohibit universal and consecutive
outcomes within a state.
The most restrictive statute is the law in Louisiana.205 Louisiana law regards an
embryo as a “person” and, therefore, prohibits it from being purposely destroyed.206
Under the statute all embryos must be transferred to a uterus.207 If the
commissioning couple, by notarial act, gives up their right to implantation, then their
embryos must be made available for adoptive implantation.208 While in a state of
cryopreservation, an embryo is “not property of the physician, IVF clinic, or the
gamete donors. The embryo can sue or be sued, but the state does not award
inheritance rights unless the embryo develops into a child born in a live birth.”209
Additionally, the commissioning couple’s rights are preserved only where they
disclose their identity; where no such disclosure is made, the treating physician is
deemed to be the temporary guardian over the frozen embryo(s).210
In contrast, a Virginia statute considers embryos to be the property of the donor
or commissioning couple.211 With respect to the commissioning couple, the IVF
clinic has the legal rights and duties of a bailee.212 While the Virginia statute is more
consumer-oriented because it calls for IVF clinics to disclose to the couple the
likelihood of procedural success,213 it does not provide for the disposition of the
embryos if the couples disagree.
An Illinois statute bans the sale of a fetus as well as experimentation upon a
fetus.214 The statute further defines an unborn child as “any individual of the human
species from fertilization until birth.”215 Additionally, while the Illinois statute
allows for the harvesting and implantation involved in the IVF procedure, it provides
ambiguous language as to the disposal of remaining embryos.216 Therefore, the
courts are left with the decision as to whether the word “fetus” is synonymous with
“embryo.”217
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Pennsylvania enacted IVF legislation as a part of its abortion statute.218 The
statute calls for quarterly reports to be filed by IVF clinics and made available to the
public.219 The information in these reports shall include: the location and personnel
of the clinic, the number of eggs fertilized, the number of embryos destroyed or
discarded, and the number of women implanted through IVF at each clinic.220 While
this statute holds IVF clinics more accountable to the public, it provides little
guidance as to whether an embryo is property, if so who’s property, and what should
be done in the case of a dispute between the commissioning parties. Additionally,
the statute does not adequately put the public on notice of the success rate of IVF
procedures.221 Nor does it inform participating couples as to the risks associated with
the procedure or the complications that arise due to decisions concerning excess
embryos.
A New Hampshire statute requires that a couple wishing to participate in IVF be
medically evaluated and deemed medically acceptable.222 Additionally, the statute
requires that the couple be examined by a psychiatrist, psychologist, pastoral
counselor or social worker licensed to practice in the state of New Hampshire.223
The purpose of the psychiatric evaluation is said to ensure the couple’s ability to give
the potential child love, affection, and guidance.224 Records of the findings and
conclusions are kept by those performing the evaluation.225 The commissioning
couple must waive their rights against disclosure of confidential information and
communications between doctor or counselor-type professionals by causing a copy
of the findings and conclusion to be filed with the court.226 Additionally, a licensed
child placement agency or the department of Health and Human Services must
conduct a home study and monitor the potential IVF couple.227 The purpose of the
home study is to assess the potential IVF couple’s ability to provide shelter, food,
clothing, medical care, and other basic necessities to the child.228 While the New
Hampshire statute is most intrusive into the potential IVF couple’s privacy for the
overall welfare of the child, the statute fails to regulate the IVF procedure itself.229
Under Florida law, a couple participating in an IVF procedure must enter into a
written agreement with their treating physician providing for the disposition of
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frozen embryos upon divorce, death of a spouse, or any other unforeseen events.230
Although a written agreement is required under the Florida statute, the statute also
regulates cases where no written agreement exists.231 In the absence of a written
agreement, the statute grants the commissioning couple joint decision-making
authority.232 However, the statute fails to address the situation, such as divorce, in
which the couple disagrees as to the disposition of frozen embryos, and where no
written agreement is in existence.
IV. OUTCOME DETERMINATION THROUGH CONTRACT LAW
In order to ensure consistent outcomes, the Florida statute suggest that the
legislature be compelled to dictate that IVF clinics enter into contracts witth the
commissioning parents addressing the disposition of embryos. This argument is
harmonious with the teachings of both Locke and Posner.233 The rationale is that
these contracts should govern in events such as divorce, the death of a party, or when
a party simply changes his/her mind. In actuality, the enforceability of such
contracts is being challenged through the doctrine of changed circumstances, the
special principles applied to adhesion contracts, and the idea that such contracts
should be void as against public policy.234
For a contract to be enforceable: (1) one party must make an “offer” to the other,
(2) which must then be “accepted” by the other party, and (3) that offer and
acceptance must be supported by an exchange of “consideration.”235 An offer
involves a proposal to enter into an agreement. It is a promise made by one party to
the other of what he/she will do in exchange for a promise or act by the other
party.236 An offer takes place when one party communicates to the other a
willingness to enter into an agreement in such a way that justifies the other party in
concluding that an enforceable agreement will result if they accept.237
An IVF clinic offers to perform the IVF procedure to the commissioning couple
for payment and for acceptance to the terms and conditions placed on that offer. The
condition placed on that offer is the disposition of the frozen embryos should the
couple disagree as to their use.
Acceptance to an offer occurs when the offeree, by words or conduct,
demonstrates “unconditional assent to the terms of the offer … Acceptance may be
reasonably implied by words or conduct.”238 The commissioning couple accepts the
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offer made by the IVF clinic by signing the contract. The terms that the couple
accepts encompass the clause dictating the fate of the embryos in case the couple
disagrees as to their use.
Consideration is present when the promise or performance represents a
bargained-for exchange.239 “A promise or performance is bargained-for if it is
sought by one party in exchange for his promise. Consideration can consist of a
promise, an act, or a promise not to do something that a party has a legal right to
do.”240 Consideration can be demonstrated through “a benefit to the other party
making the promise to which he is not already lawfully entitled, or any detriment to
the other, that he was not already lawfully bound to suffer.”241
The consideration in a contract between the commissioning couple is the
bargained-for exchange of a promise of payment for services. That is, the couple
seeks the promise by the IVF clinic to perform the IVF procedure and pays a fee for
that promise.
Given that a contract between a commissioning couple can theoretically meet all
the elements of an enforceable contract, it seems as though requiring IVF clinics to
execute such contracts before allowing a couple to participate in IVF procedures
would be the most administratively effective method. However, such contracts may
not be enforceable where a defense exists against their enforcement. Commentators
suggest that one possible defense is the doctrine of changed circumstances.242
Nonperformance of a contract may be excused for changed circumstances as
expressed in §§ 261-272 of the Restatement (Second) of Contracts.243 For a
subsequent event to be deemed a changed circumstance for the purpose of
performance excusal, “the party seeking relief must establish that both parties
assumed at the time of contracting that the changed circumstances would not occur
and the changed circumstances made performance as agreed impracticable.”244 If
performance as agreed upon would be impracticable, then the duty to perform is
discharged.245
Therefore, the defense of changed circumstance requires
impracticability and lack of foreseeability.246 Impracticability is best explained
through a commercial context.247 “Under this interpretation, the promisor was
excused for nonperformance when, due to changed circumstances, the performance
still could be performed, but only at excessive and unreasonable cost.”248 Is, then,
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the cost of the forgone use of the embryos excessive and unreasonable? Does the
party’s ability to achieve parenthood by other reasonable means affect the answer?
In addition to impracticability, in the arena of changed circumstance, courts tend
to look at whether the subsequent events were foreseeable by the parties.249
Therefore, even if performance of the contract is impracticable, a party’s
performance may not be excused where the subsequent event or changed
circumstance could have been foreseen or anticipated by the parties.250 Here, parties
in favor of allowing the doctrine of changed circumstance in contracts between IVF
clinic and commissioning couples propose that while a party may be charged with
the ability to foresee the possibility of certain subsequent events, the couple could
not foresee the feelings associated with those events.251 As described earlier in the
surrogate setting, a mother cannot know what it is to give up a child until she has
done so.252 The same argument could be made that a woman cannot know her
desperation to use the embryos until she is faced with the fact of having them
destroyed.
One argument is premised on the fact that the doctrine of changed circumstances
will apply to any clause restricting the distribution of embryos because of the great
amount of time that passes.253 This notion involves the inability to predict how one
may feel when the disagreement arises and the clause governing the disposition of
the embryo is triggered.254 “Furthermore, it would be inequitable to bind the parties
to a reproductive decision made at a time when their needs and interests may have
been completely different.”255 These needs and interests may have changed
drastically during the passage of years between the commissioning couple’s decision
to undergo IVF, having excess embryos frozen, and their subsequent decision over
the use of those embryos.256 Even the Kass court recognized these difficulties due to
the uncertainty inherent in the IVF procedure.257 “The court listed ‘[d]ivorce; death,
disappearance or incapacity of one or both partners; aging; [and] the birth of other
children’ as being among some of the obvious changes in circumstances that might
take place over time.”258 For example, as we have seen in prior case discussion,
during a divorce one party may strongly feel that he/she does not want offspring to
result from the failed marriage.259 Should that party still be bound to a clause in the
249
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IVF contract that states that the excess frozen embryos shall be rewarded to the party
who intends them to be implanted? What results in the situation where the parties
contracted to have the embryos discarded and, facing divorce, one party believes that
implantation of those embryos is the only possibility of becoming a parent?260 “In
either case, the claim of unfairness due to changed circumstance injects legal
uncertainty into the situation.”261 Recently, scholars have also addressed the issue of
changed circumstance in IVF contracts in situations where the woman has undergone
premature menopause since the embryos had been frozen or for a number of reasons
she could not safely repeat the egg retrieval process.262
Opponents to the doctrine of changed circumstance in the IVF setting argue that
one should not be relieved of their contractual agreement, despite the change in
circumstances, unless she did not knowingly or freely enter into that agreement.263
Additionally, these scholars argue the strength of the privacy interest for that party
wishing to avoid unwanted parenthood, and advocate that it is unfair to place such a
burden on a person especially when that person believed that their privacy interest
was protected by the IVF contract.264 In making the
agreement the parties had the opportunity jointly to determine their
reproductive futures. Holding them to the agreement recognizes their
procreative liberty, gives the couple and the IVF program clear guidance,
and also provides courts with an efficient means of resolving such
disputes. The issue in such cases should be whether in fact there was a
validly made agreement that covers the issue at hand, and not whether
such agreements should be enforced despite a party’s change of mind or
circumstance.265
Additionally, scholars argue that the problems of foreseeability and changed
circumstances arising in the disposition of embryos are not different from those that
arise in a wide gamma of other agreements, which are held to be binding despite a
subsequent event that makes enforcement of the contract undesirable for one party.266
In response, proponents contend that the application of the doctrine of changed
circumstances to prevent the enforcement of IVF contracts, in certain circumstances,
is good policy.267 “[I]t would be inconsistent to acknowledge all of the difficulties in
making this type of contract only to allow it to be enforced in all circumstances.”268
While such commentators concede that IVF contracts should not be disregarded for
260

Id.

261

Id.

262

Id. at 414.

263

Id.

264

Robertson, supra note 252, at 414.

265

John A. Robertson, Prior Agreements for Disposition of Frozen Embryos, 51 OHIO ST.
L.J. 407, 414 (1990).
266

Haut, supra note 255, at 522.

267

Id.

268

Id.

132

JOURNAL OF LAW AND HEALTH

[Vol. 17:103

mere change of mind, proponents believe that where the events were unforeseeable,
or the enforcement would be unconscionable, a party’s non-performance should be
excused due to the speculative nature inherent in such contracts.269
Where the doctrine of changed circumstance is granted to excuse performance of
a contract, the performance promised is completely discharged rather than reformed
or adjusted by the court.270 Once performance is discharged, the remedies for the
promise “include compensation for work done and restitution only to the extent that
he has conferred a benefit on the other party by way of part performance or
reliance.”271 Reliance beyond the scope of restitution is likely to be unrecoverable.
The remedy provided in the doctrine of changed circumstance seems to be applicable
to the disposition of frozen embryos while other contract remedies do not, because of
the inability to conform the embryos to other traditional contract remedies.
Other scholars contend that such contracts may be unenforceable due to the fact
that they are contracts of adhesion. In such a setting they may be unconscionable.272
Unconscionability, “in certain situations, could be considered something that is not
only unexpected but also hard on the complaining party.”273 Unconscionability can
arise in contracts of adhesion.274
“An adhesion contract is a standardized form contract offered to consumers of
goods and services on essentially a take-it-or-leave-it basis, without affording the
consumer a realistic opportunity to bargain.”275 The vast majority of consumer
transactions in this country involve contracts of adhesion.276 Under a contract of
adhesion, a consumer cannot obtain the desired service or product without accepting
the terms of the form contract.277 This is especially apparent in the IVF setting,
where the couple does not have a chance to decide the disposition. Instead, the IVF
contract contains a boilerplate provision stating that the embryos will be donated to
the IVF clinic, in case dispute arises. In most instances, a couple cannot obtain the
IVF procedure without consenting to the IVF clinic’s terms for embryo
distribution.278 Thus, it is easy to see how IVF contracts can be viewed as contracts
of adhesion. The question remains as to whether these adhesion contracts rise to the
level of unconscionability.
Unequal bargaining power may exist between the commissioning couple and the
IVF clinic considering that couples are often in a fragile emotional state at the time
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of contacting the IVF clinic because of their failed attempts at achieving offspring.279
Additionally, commissioning couples do not possess the same level of expertise as
the IVF clinics and the couples are limited in choosing another clinic because of
geographical constraints and the limited number of IVF clinics in existence.280 These
inequalities give further evidence that contracts between IVF clinics and the
commissioning couples are contracts of adhesion.281 Given that IVF clinics are
private institutions, they have the power to determine their institutional policies on
the disposition of embryos and, therefore, have monopoly power over the choices a
couple can have concerning embryo disposition.282 Therefore, a clinic opposed to a
certain method of embryo distribution has no obligation to make that method
available to the couple.283
Although the terms of an adhesion contract may not be unconscionable,
enforcement of the contract may be unconscionable due to the circumstances of the
parties.284 While unconscionability is difficult to define, a suggested definition is
that a provision is unconscionable if it is such that “no fair-minded person would
impose on another and that no competent person would freely and knowingly submit
to.”285 This could lead to a claim that no fair-minded person would give away
embryos that she intended to implant or that no-fair minded person would impose
unwanted parenthood on themselves or someone else.286
Historically, adhesion contracts “were developed in response to economic
factors. During the early rise of capitalism, most exchanges took place at arms
length. But, as the economy evolved … such contracts of adhesion became prevalent
due to their efficient and utilitarian function.”287 Under these circumstances, it is no
surprise, then, that Posner would oppose the idea of finding IVF contracts
unconscionable solely because they are contracts of adhesion. Not only is Posner a
proponent of contract enforcement, but he is also a champion of economic
efficiency.288
Additionally, some commentators argue that contracts for the disposition of
embryos should be likened to that of surrogacy contracts.289 Surrogacy contracts,
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where the surrogate is being paid for actually giving the baby up for adoption rather
than for the gestational services involved in carrying the child, are void as against
public policy.290 This can be likened to the disposition of frozen embryos through an
argument founded by Posner’s adversaries. That is, a woman lacks the ability to
truly consent to giving up her child or her embryo because she cannot appreciate the
emotional trauma that may ensue until actually completing the action.291 The flaw of
this argument is that surrogacy agreements lack enforceability because the bargained
for exchange is compensation for giving up a child rather than the labor associated
with the gestational services.292 Such a situation arises where payment is made
conditional upon giving up the child.293 Therefore, the argument of Posner’s
adversaries becomes applicable only where a state labels an embryo as a person
cloaked with all rights given to persons in the Constitution.
V. CONCLUSION
The end result is a slippery slope among the classifications of an embryo as
property, person, or a special category of quasi-property rights. If an embryo is
property, then it should be disposed of according to property guidelines. These
property guidelines are laid out in the theories of Locke and Posner.294 Both Locke
and Posner suggest that an embryo should be treated as property because reducing a
resource to private ownership allows for a proper reward and, thus, motivation for
labor as well as economic efficiency.295 Great deference should be given to these
theorists because their teachings gave birth to property law.296 History dictates that
where such schools of thought are not followed the results are misappropriation of
resources and communal failure.297 Therefore, where a dispute arises as to the
distribution of an embryo and no contract governs such a dispute, that embryo should
be treated as property and awarded to the party seeking its use. Resources are more
highly regarded when reduced to private property.298 Additionally, the use of that
property, rather than its waste, not only maximizes happiness through allowing that
property to become valued, but promotes a more economic efficient society by not
allowing for the resource to spoil and, thus, accrue no economic benefit.299
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Both Locke and Posner hold contract law in the highest regard.300 While it is
fulfilling and economically sound to be rewarded individual ownership over an entity
with which one has mixed his/her own labor, it is equally important to protect one’s
freedom to contract. Contract law is as basic to communal survival as property
distribution.301 While contracts with IVF clinics have inherent complications, these
trouble areas do not rise to the level of concern associated with surrogacy
contracts.302
Surrogacy contracts are void as against public policy and
unconscionable solely when they embody an agreement that in essence is payment
for a child (deemed a person by law) rather than for gestational services.303
Additionally, adhesion contracts are a product of their economic efficiency and
enforced in a wide range of situations everyday.304 Rights that evolve due to the
need for economic efficiency are the basis of the law and economic theory.305 Thus,
contracts between commissioning couples and IVF clinics cannot be void solely on
the basis that they are contracts of adhesion. In the name of economic efficiency and
maximization of happiness of society as a whole, contracts between IVF clinics and
commissioning couples must be enforced where they meet the enforceability
requirements laid down by contract law.
Although Posner and Locke do not revere federal regulation,306 it seems to be the
only solution to reach the preferred end of contract formation prior to engaging in the
IVF process. Whether or not an embryo is property, its ultimate fate can be decided
through contract without reverence to its social standing. Thus, it is up to the federal
government to enact legislation that requires all states to create statutes requiring
IVF clinics to enter into a contractual agreement with the commissioning couple
concerning the disposition of embryos upon a disagreement as to their use. This
legislation should be specific and give proper direction to IVF clinics and the courts
to minimize external administrative costs. These statutes should also be sensitive to
and anticipate the previous attacks on the enforceability of such contracts. For
example, IVF clinics could be compelled to allow for the commissioning couple to
be informed of all of their options and be allowed to freely choose the means of
distribution with which they are most comfortable. That is, an IVF clinic should be
restricted from limiting these options or only allowing for one option such as that the
embryos be donated to the clinic for research. Additionally, the subject of embryo
disposition should be written in a bold or conspicuous type or be a separate
agreement from that of the general IVF contract. The commissioning couple should
be separately advised on this matter and informed of all the consequences of their
decision. A mandatory waiting period between this counseling session and
execution of the contract should be compelled through such statutes. Following
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these recommendations would diminish arguments enforceability and improve the
bargaining ability and the quality of the informed consent of the commissioning
couple.
SHELLY R. PETRALIA

